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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE -

PART II

Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
In the last issue of the Reporter, the first of a
two-part article on scientific evidence was published. See Scientific Evidence - Part I, 3 Public
Defender Rptr. (Jan.-Feb. 1980). Part I examined a
number of legal issues that are involved in the use
of scientific evidence. This article focuses on particular scientific techniques. In an article of this
scope, it is not possible to discuss all types of
scientific evidence, nor is it possible to discuss
any particular technique in detail. The purpose of
the article is merely to highlight a number of forensic procedures that have proved controversial or
are frequently encountered in criminal practice.
Knowledge of the various types of scientific
evidence currently available in criminal investigations can be used in several ways by the defense·
tor example, it can be used to challenge the
'
testimony of a prosecution expert and to facilitate
~ the presentation of a defense based on scientific
1r evidence. In addition, such knowledge often will
· enable the defense to question the absence of
scientific evidence in the prosecution's case. If the
government had the opportunity to use and present scientific evidence but failed to do so this
circumstance may be a persuasive factor i~
establishing reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jurors.
A number of texts deal with the subject of scientific evidence. See A. Moenssens & F. lnbau
Sci~ntific Evidence in Criminal Cases (2d ed.' 1978);
J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence (2d ed.
1974); C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 20 (2d ed. 1972).
The Moenssens and lnbau text is undoubtedly the
best single-volume reference work in the field· it
C?~ers a wide _ra~ge of scientific techniques, proVIdmg a descnpt1on of each as well as a discussion of the legal developments and a bibliography.
Another book that may prove useful is the FBI
Handbook of Forensic Science (Rev. 1978). This
text outlines the various services that are provided
by the FBI laboratory. Its importance to defense
c.ounsel lies in the fact that it sets forth the limitatiOns o_f m_any techniques and thus provides an
authontat1ve text (learned treatise) for the impeachment of experts who overstate the conclu-

sions that may be drawn from these techniques.
VOICEPRINT EVIDENCE
Voiceprint identification is premised on the uniqueness of each human voice (interspeaker
variability). Since a speaker will not pronounce the
same word in exactly the same way twice (intraspeaker variability), voiceprint identification
d~pends on ~he extent that i~te~~peaker variability
d1ffers from mtraspeaker vanabll1ty. The voiceprint
technique involves the use of a sound spectrograph to produce a visual display (a spectrogram) of selected words and phrases from a
tape recording. The examiner then compares a
spectrogram obtained from the suspect with the
spectrogram produced from a tape recording involved with a crime. Like fingerprint firearm and
handwriting comparisons, the comp~rison of spectrograms involves a subjective evaluation on the
part of the examiner.
Judicial acceptance of voiceprint evidence has
had a checkered history. A number of courts have
accepted such evidence. See U.S. v. Williams 583
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.'1117
(1979); U.S. v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v.
Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me.
1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327
N.E.2d 671 (1975). On the other hand, a number of
courts, including the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Courts of California, Michigan and Pennsylvania
have rejected voiceprint evidence. See United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,
391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141,
257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Tapa, 471
Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
State v. Olderman
One Ohio case has considered the issue. In
State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d 130, 336 N.E.2d
442 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the admissibility of voiceprint evidence. The precedential
value of 0/derman, however, is suspect for several

Public Defender: Hyman Friedman
i~~ah~ga Count~ Publi~ Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113
itor. Paul C. Giannelli, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Associate Editor: Thomas S. Hudson

Telephone: (216) 623-7223

:::!~cation of the Public Defender Reporter is made possible by a grant from the Cleveland Foundation. The views expressed
em _are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender or the Cleveland Foundation.
Copynght C 7980 by Paul C. Giannelli

reasons. First, the court purported to apply the
general acceptance test which requires that an innovative scientific technique be generally accepted by the scientific community as a prerequisite to admissibility. This test has been
justified on the grounds that it "assures that those
most qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method will have the determinative
voice." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the
general acceptance standard, see Scientific
Evidence - Part I at 2. The court in Olderman,
however, did not look to the scientific community
to determine whether voiceprint analysis had been
generally accepted; rather, the court concluded
that voiceprint evidence had satisfied the general
acceptance standard solely on the basis of cases
upholding the admissibility of the technique. In effect, the views of courts, not scientists, were determinative. This does not comport with the rationale
underlying the general acceptance standard.
Second, even assuming that reliance on prior
judicial decisions is a proper application of the
general acceptance standard, the court's analysis
remains troublesome. Although the court
acknowledged that a number of cases had rejected
voiceprint evidence, the court ignored those cases.
These cases demonstrated that general acceptance has not been achieved. Moreover, several
cases cited by the court as upholding voiceprint
evidence did not apply the general acceptance
test, see Worley v. State, 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. App.
1972); Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1972);
Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432
(1971), and one of the cases cited as upholding the
admissibility of voiceprint evidence was subsequently overturned. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d
24, 130 Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976), overruling
Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App.3d 778, 106
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
Third, after Olderman was decided the National
Academy of Sciences, at the request of the FBI,
appointed a committee to evaluate voiceprint identifications. The committee concluded:

POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
The polygraph technique is based on the
assumption that psychological stress caused by
the fear of detection will produce involuntary
physiological responses - changes in blood
pressure, pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin
resistance. These responses are recorded on a
chart by the polygraph machine and then
evaluated by the examiner. Both the critics and
proponents of polygraph evidence agree that the
examiner plays the most crucial role in the technique. His expertise is critical in determining
suitability of a subject for testing, formulating proper test quE;)stions, detecting attempts to mask or
create chart reactions, stimulating a subject to
react, and interpreting the results of the examination. For a further discussion of the polygraph
technique, see J. Reid & F. lnbau, Truth and
Deception (2d ed. 1977); S. Abrams, A Polygraph
Handbook for Attorneys (1977); Legal Admissibility
of the Polygraph (N. Ansley ed. 1975).
From 1923 when the results of a polygraph examination were rejected in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), until the early 1970s
polygraph evidence was excluded in virtually every
reported decision. Since 1972 a number of courts
have admitted, or have recognized a trial court's
discretion to admit, polygraph evidence. Cases admitting polygraph results include United States v.
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313
N.E.2d 120 (1974); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539
P.2d 204 (1975). Cases recognizing trial discretion
to admit polygraph evidence are cited in Tarlow,
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An
Aid in Determining Credibility In a Perjury-Plagued
System, 26 Hastings L.J. 917, 948-50 (1975). Two
Ohio cases have admitted polygraph evidence notwithstanding the absence of a stipulation. See
State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24
(C.P.1977); State v. Hancock, 71 Ohio Ops.2d 458
(C.P. 1974). The Sfms decision was based on the
compulsory process clause. For other constitutional arguments in support of admissibility, see
Note, Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55 Ind. L.J. 157 (1979); Scientific
Evidence - Part I at 6.

The practice of voice identification rests on the
assumption that intraspeaker variability is less
than or different from interspeaker variability.
However, at present the assumption is not adequately supported by scientific theory and data.
Viewpoints about probable errors in identification
decisions at present result mainly from various professional judgments and fragmentary experimental
results rather than from objective data representative of results in forensic applications.
The Committee concludes that the technical
uncertainties concerning the present practice of
voice identification are so great as to require that
forensic applications be approach with great caution. National Academy of Sciences, On the Theory
and Practice of Voice Identification 2 (1979).

Admissibility by Stipulation
Perhaps the most important development in this
area has been the growing trend to admit evidencE
of polygraph examinations if the parties stipulate
in advance to the admissibility of the results. See
J. Reid & F. lnbau, Truth and Deception 325-35 (2d
ed. 1977); Comment, The Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in
Criminal Proceedings, 5 Akron L. Rev. 235 (1972);
Comment, Evidence: Lie Detector Tests - Effect
of Prior Stipulation on Admissibility of Results, 18
U. Fla. L. Rev. 527 (1965); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005
(1973).
In State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 372 N.E.2d
1318 (1978), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
polygraph evidence pursuant to a stipulation is ad
missible. In reaching this result, the Court explicit
ly adopted the conditions for admissibility set
forth in State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894
(1962). Those conditions include: (1) a written
stipulation signed by the defendant, defense
counsel and prosecutor, (2) judicial discretion to

Thus, the most recent and comprehensive study of
voiceprints demonstrates that the scientific community has yet to accept the technique. In sum,
the status of voiceprint evidence in Ohio is far
from settled.
See generally, A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 12 (2d ed.
1978); 0. Tosi, Voice Identification, Theory and
Legal Applications (1979); Siegel, CrossExamination of a "Voiceprint" Expert: A Blueprint
For Trial Lawyers, 12 Grim. L. Bull. 509 (1976); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 915 (1973).
2

trial." /d. at 411,255 N.W.2d at 197. See also State
v. Cantanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La. 1979); Note, People v. Barbara: The Admissibility of Polygraph Test
Results in Support of a Motion tor New Trial, 1978
Det. C.L. Rev. 347; Note, Admissibility of Polygraph
at Post-Conviction Hearings on Motion tor New
Trial, 55 U. Det. J. Urban L. 155 (1977); Note,
Criminal Law- Polygraph Examination Results
Admissible in Post-Conviction Hearings, 56 N.C. L.
Rev. 380 (1978).
In addition, polygraph evidence has been admitted in suppression and sentencing hearings. See
People v. Cutter, 12 Grim. L. Rptr. 2133 (L.A. Super.
Ct. Nov. 6, 1972); State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546,521
P.2d 978 (1974); State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super.
213, 278 A.2d 543 (1971 ).

exclude the results notwithstanding the stipulation
if the trial judge is not satisfied the examiner is
qualified or the test was conducted properly, (3) an
opportunity for the opposing party to cross~~~~ examine the examiner regarding his qualifications,
IJ the procedures employed in conducting the examination, the limitations of the technique, the
possibilities of error, as well as other pertinent
matters, and (4) a jury instruction on the use and
effect of polygraph evidence. See generally, Note,
State v. Souel: Ohio Turns the Corner on Polygraph
Evidence, 8 Cap. U.L. Rev. 287 (1978).
A defense attorney who wishes to have the
results of a stipulated polygraph examination admitted in evidence faces a number of problems.
First, before raising with the prosecutor the
possibility of a stipulated examination, the
defense attorney should arrange to have his client
examined by a defense expert. The reasons for this
precaution are self-evident. The client will waive
the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination by agreeing to the examination, see
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966),
and counsel should not advise such a waiver
without first knowing the probable results of the
examination. The pre-stipulation examination,
however, may raise the problem of the "friendly
polygrapher." Dr. Martin Orne has described this
problem as follows:

.fla
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GUNSHOT RESIDUE TESTS
Gunshot residue tests are used to determine
whether a person recently has fired a weapon, a
determination which can be important in identifying an assailant, proving or rebutting a selfdefense claim, and distinguishing a suicide from a
homicide. All tests are designed to detect powder
or primer residues which, due to the backblast of
gases which escape through crevices in the
weapon, may be deposited on the hand of a person discharging a gun.
The "Paraffin Test"
The "paraffin test," which was designed to
detect nitrate and nitrite residues (powder
residues), was first introduced in this country in
the early 1930s and was adopted quickly by law
enforcement agencies. A paraffin cast is used to
remove the residues from the hands at which time
the cast is treated with a reagent, either
diphenylamine or diphenylbenzidine. The appearance of blue specks indicates a positive reaction. The admissibility of evidence based on this
test has been upheld by a number of courts. The
first reported case accepting the test was Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304
(1936), and cases following Westwood are found
through the 1960s. See Harris v. State, 239 Ark.
771, 394 S.W.2d 135 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
964 (1967); State v. Hoy, 199 Kan. 340, 430 P.2d 275
(1967); People v. Simpson, 5 Mich. App. 479, 146
N.W.2d 828 (1966); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507
(Mo. 1968).
Notwithstanding judicial acceptance, the paraffin test is seriously deficient because it is nonspecific; a significant number of substances other
than gunpowder residues contain nitrates and
nitrites and therefore also produce a positive reaction. One study reported that a positive reaction is
produced by" 'rust,' colored fingernail polishes,
residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap
water." Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin
Test," 12 J. Forensic Sci. 19, 23 (1967). Another
study found that "[t]obacco or tobacco ash, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, urine .
... " produce a reaction. Turkel & Lipman,
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test tor Gunpowder,
46 J. Grim. L., C. & P.S. 281, 282 (1955). As a result
of these and other studies, a number of courts
have rejected the paraffin test. See Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Born v.
State, 397 P.2d 924 (Okla. Grim. 1964), cert. denied
379 U.S. 100 (1965); Clarke v. St~te, 218 Tenn. 259,
402 S.W.2d 863 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 942

The guilty individual when tested by a friendly
polygrapher knows that the results of the test if he
is found deceptive will not be used against him ....
As a consequence, the client's fears about being
detected are greatly reduced. As we have been able
to show in the laboratory, and as is acknowledged
by all polygraph experts, a suspect's fear of detection is the major factor in assuring his augmented
physiological response while lying. It is precisely
this aspect of the situation which is most
dramatically altered when the polygraph is
employed by the defendant's attorney. Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for Detection of
Deception, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph
94, 114-15 (N. Ansley ed. 1975).

If Orne's theory is correct, the client may pass the
defense-sponsored examination but not the examination administered pursuant to the stipula- tion. Thus, it may be advisable not to inform the
='Client that the first examiner is "friendly."
Second, care should be exercised in preparing
.. the stipulation. This requires a thorough
knowledge of the polygraph technique. The stipula- tion should state explicitly that the examiner is not
,•.to interrogate the client. Moreover, counsel should
~:-~-be present during the examination to ensure that
- interrogation does not ensue either before or after
the examination.
f;C•Admissibility in Collateral Proceedings
Inroads into the general rule excluding
~;•7Polygraph evidence have not been limited to the
.~~st_ip.ulation cases. A number of courts, while not
1'''-:'lllmg to admit the results of polygraph examina;'*•;trons at trial, have admitted such evidence in other
·~ contexts. The rationale for such an approach was
· ·.. ted by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v.
ara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). In
ing that polygraph evidence could be conered in ruling on a motion for a new trial, the
rt commented: "Since the defendant's guilt or
nee is not at issue, some procedures are
issible which would not be acceptable at

;3s

3

(1966). Moreover, the FBI has ceased to use the
paraffin test. See Gunshot Residues and Shot Pattern Tests, 39 FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 7 (Sept.
1970).
See generally, A. · Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 584 (2d ed. 1978);
Conrad, Evidential Implications of the Dermal
Nitrate Test tor Gunpowder Residues, 44 Marq. L.
Rev. 500 (1961); Midkoff, Detection of Gunshot
Residues: Modern Solutions for an Old Problem, 3
J. Police Sci. & Ad. 77 (1975).
Harrison-Gilroy Test
In 1959 a new method of gunshot residue detection was reported by Harold Harrison and Robert
Gilroy. See Harrison & Gilroy, Firearms Discharge
Residues, 4 J. Forensic Sci. 184 (1959). Unlike the
paraffin test, the Harrison-Gilroy test was designed
to detect primer, rather than powder, residues the elements antimony, barium, and lead. Thus,
the nonspecificity problem associated with the
paraffin test was obviated. Nevertheless, the
Harrison-Gilroy test was not adopted widely
because of its marginal sensitivity. See Pillay, New
Method tor the Collection and Analysis of Gunshot
Residues as Forensic Evidence, 19 J. Forensic Sci.
769 (1974).
There have been few reported decisions involving this test. In Commonwealth v. Farrior, 446 Pa.
31, 284 A.2d 684 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the admissiblity of the HarrisonGilroy test. The court, however, cited Commonwealth v. Westwood, a paraffin test case, as
authority for its holding, apparently believing that
the two tests were identical. In State v. Smith, 50
Ohio App.2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976), a police
officer claimed to have used a modified version of
the Harrison-Gilroy test to detect residues on the
defendant's hand. The test was rejected on appeal.
According to the appellate court, the evidence in
the record failed to establish that the officer was
qualified "either to testify as to the theoretical
basis of a new test for determining the presence
of gunshot residue or to give expert testimony that
such a test was generally accepted in the scientific community." /d. at 193, 362 N.E.2d at 1246.
Instrumental Analysis
Currently, a variety of instrumental techniques
are used to detect gunshot residues. Perhaps the
most common is neutron activation analysis. This
method of analysis is discussed intra. In addition,
atomic absorption spectrometry has been used in
several cases. Like the Harrison-Gilroy test and activation analysis, this method is designed to detect
the primer residues antimony and barium. The
technique is described in Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances by Instrumental Analysis,
22 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 385, 476-87 (1969);
Midkiff, Detection of Gunshot Residues: Modern
Solutions tor an Old Problem, 3 J. Police Sci. & Ad.
77 (1975). Several cases have accepted atomic absorption as a method of gunshot residue detection. See Chatom v. State, 48 So.2d 828 (Ala. Grim.
Ap.), rev'd 348 So.2d 838 (Ala.), acq. 348 So.2d 843
(Ala. Grim. App. 1977); State v. Crowder, 285 N.C.
42, 203 S.E.2d 38 (1974), modified on other
grounds, 428 U.S. 903 (1976); State v. Chatman, 156
N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 (1978).
One other method of detection has received
judicial consideration. In People v. Palmer, 80 Cal.

App.3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978), the court
upheld the detection of gunshot residues by scanning electron microscopic analysis. See generally,
Anrasko & Maehly, Detection of Gunshot Residues
on Hands by Scanning Electron Microscopy, 22 J.
Forensic Sci. 279 (1977); Matricardi & Kilty, Detection of Gunshot Residue Particles from the Hands
of a Shooter, 22 J. Forensic Sci. 725 (1977).
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) is a
qualitative and quantitative method for determining the elemental composition of substances. A
sample is first subjected to neutron bombardment
in a nuclear reactor under controlled conditions.
Once removed from the reactor, the irradiated
substance tends to return to a stable atomic state
(radioactive decay) during which time subatomic
particles are emitted from the sample. One type of
particle, gamma rays, is then detected and
counted by means of gamma ray spectrometry.
Since each element has a characteristic energy
level of gamma radiation and a known rate of
decay (half-life), these two indicia are used to
determine the elemental composition of the sample.
NAA is forensically applied in two types of examinations. First, it is used in situations in which
only the presence or absence of one or more
elements is significant. For example, in the detection of gunshot residues, NAA is used to detect
the presence and quantity of the elements antimony and barium on the hands of a person
suspected of discharging a weapon. These
elements are the primer constituents of most
American-manufactured ammunition and their
presence in certain concentrations is indicative of
a recent discharge of a firearm. Second, NAA is
used for comparative purposes. Trace elements in
hair, blood, paint, soil, glass, bullets, drugs, and
other substances discovered at a crime scene can
be compared with•similar items obtained from a
suspect.
Because NAA is extremely sensitive, minute
samples such as a single hair or paint chip can be
analyzed. In some cases NAA is nondestructive,
and therefore the evidence can be re-examined or
introduced undamaged at trial. Nevertheless, the
expense associated with operating a nuclear reactor is a disadvantage; only the major government,
university, and industrial laboratories have the
capability to conduct this type of analysis.
Admissibility of NAA Evidence
The theory of NAA is well accepted by the scientific community. Moreover, the technique - the
use of a nuclear reactor irradiation and gamma ray
spectrometry for detection - is recognized as an
accurate analytical method of detection for many
elements. Thus, it is not surprising that most
courts that have considered NAA evidence have
upheld its admissibility. E.g., U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971)
(analysis of bomb debris); People v. Collins, 43
Mich. App. 259, 204 N.W.2d 290 (1972), aft'd, 391
Mich. 798 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974)
(hair analysis); State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216
N.W. 2d 131 (1974) (gunshot residue); State v.
Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd
on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (particle
analysis); State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009 (Ore.
4

1974) (bullet analysis). See also Annat., 50 A.L.R.3d
117 (1973).
Several courts, however, have held NAA
- evidence inadmissible for a variety of reasons. in
U.S. v_. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969~, t~e Second
Circuit reversed the defendant's conv1ct1on for
drug offenses because the prosecution failed to
provide the defendant with adequate notice o~ activation analysis of the drugs. in State v. Coolidge,
109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the court upheld the
admissibility of activation analysis of particles but
rejected NAA of hair samples. According to the
court, hair analysis "would not be acceptable to
scientists in the field" and thus would not satisfy
the general acceptance standard. !d. at 420, 260
A.2d at 560. in State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo.
1972), the court rejected NAA of blood because
this type of analysis also had not gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. /d. at 371.
The Ohio Supreme Court considered the admissibility of NAA in State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d
81, 246 N.E. 365 (1969). The Court held that the
results of activation analysis of hair was inadmissible. The Court, however, did not challenge
directly the reliability of the technique; instead, the
Court reversed because the NAA expert testified
that the hair samples were likely to have come
(rather than probably came) from the same source.
Interpretation Problems
The major problem associated with NAA
evidence involves the interpretation of the results
of activation analysis and not the validity of the
~technique. For example, in the detection of gun'll shot residues, NAA is used to detect the presence
· j and quantity of the elements antimony and barium
on the hands of a person suspected of firing a
weapon. In State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216
N.W.2d 131 (1974), a government expert testified
that NAA revealed the presence of 1.67
micrograms of barium and 1.33 micrograms of antimony on the defendant's hands, thus conclusively establishing, in the expert's opinion, that the
defendant recently had fired a gun.
The presence and quantity of antimony and
,-:-barium, however, have no probative value unless
· the detected amounts differ from normal concentrations of these elements in the general population. The relevance of this type of information,
" therefore, depends on the validity of background
studies of the general population and the proper
,, correlation of these studies with the data derived
::~from the analysis in a particular case. In short,
NAA involves a problem of statistical probability.
'"See Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron
:=Activation Analysis, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 997 (1971).
~Jhus, one commentator has suggested that the
~,::~(jefense stipulate to the test results, and thereby
~f~s>cus the jury's attention on the interpretation
.,;:!ssue. !d. at 1035-36. This tactic also would focus
~~~ttention on the expert's qualifications because
,,,·e~pertise in statistics, not chemistry, is critical.
.;,•finally, concentrating on the interpretative aspects
~l NAA may expose the exaggerated claims of
~~orne experts, such as statements that NAA is "as
~~nfallible as that of fingerprints." State v. Cool!dge,
ri~-s09 N.H. 403, 420, 260 A.2d 547, 560 (1969), rev don
~~!her grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also State
lv(WSpencer, 298 Minn. 456,461,216 N.W.2d 131,_134
i;.1~,;.·974) ("We are concerned ... about the sweeping

and unqualified manner in which [the NAA
expert's] testimony was offered.").
See also Watkins & Watkins, Identification of
Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis, 15
AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 115 (1964); A. Moenssens
& F. Jnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases
ch. 9 (2d ed. 1978).
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TRACE METAL DETECTION TECHNIQUE
Closely associated with gunshot residue tests,
is the trace metal detection technique (TMDT). This
test, however, is not used to establish that a person recently has fired a gun; it is used to establish
that a person has handled a metal object, which
may have been a gun. TMDT was developed pursuant to a grant by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration. See LEAA, Trace Metal
Detection Technique in Law Enforcement (Oct.
1970). According to that study, "[r]esearch has
determined that metal objects leave traces on skin
and clothing surfaces in characteristic patterns
with intensities proportional to the interaction of
weight, friction, or duration of contact with metal
objects. The Trace Metal Detection Technique
(TMDT) makes such metal trace patterns visible
when skin or clothing is treated with a test solution and then is illuminated by ultraviolet light." /d.
at 1. The pattern is photographed once it becomes
visible. /d. at 6.
Three reported cases, including one from Ohio,
have considered the admissibility of TMDT
evidence. In two ofthese cases, State v. Daniels,
37 Ohio App.2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973), and Reid
v. State, 2671nd. 555,372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978), admissibility was upheld. Nevertheless, both cases
present problems. Daniels, the first reported case
involving TMDT, illustrates these problems. First,
in that case evidence derived from TMDT was
based on the testimony of a "ballistics expert."
Although TMDT is des1gned to connect a person
with the handling of a gun, the expertise needed to
conduct this test is in no way related to the expertise of a firearms identification ("ballistics") examiner. Second, even if the police officer who
testified was qualified to perform the test, he was
not a scientist and therefore was not qualified to
testify about the validity of the underlying theory
of TMDT. Third, the court in Daniels did not apply
the general acceptance test for the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence. This test has been accepted by the Ohio courts of appeal. See Scientific
Evidence - Part I at 2.
The Reid decision raises similar problems. In
that case the expert testified that "his knowledge
concerning TMDT came from a seminar presented
by the manufacturer of the chemical solution, written instructions that accompanied the chemical
and his personal experience in conducting such
tests upon approximately fifteen occasions. He admitted that he had no understanding of the reason
for the reaction that occurred when such test was
administered." 267 Ind. at 559, 372 N.E.2d at 1152.
Nevertheless, the court admitted the evidence. In
support of its decision, the court offered only a
barren and unadorned conclusion - "we believe
[TMDT] is generally recognized as reliable." /d. In
contrast, TMDT evidence was rejected in People v.
Lauro, 91 Misc.2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977),
because there was "absolutely no testimony
before the Court as to this test having been received in any court or in the literature of forensic
5

The problem of specificity in the bite mark
analysis results from the lack of a scientific core of
basic data for comparison. The results of the bite
mark comparison may indicate a perfect or
reasonably perfect fit between the bite mark and a
suspect's dentition; however, how can one be absolutely or even perhaps reasonably certain that no
other individual could have produced a particular
bite? Classified bite mark charcteristics on large
segments of the population are unavailable;
therefore, an absolute scientific estimation of
specificity regarding the particular bite
mark/suspect comparison is not possible. The
situation is comparable to the point in the distant
past when the 100th set of fingerprints was
classified. At that time, it was known that the set
of prints did not match the ninety-nine others .
previously recorded, but it was not known if the set
of prints were specific for only the one individual
fingerprinted. I. Sopher, Forensic Dentistry 140

science; nor is there any scientific data presented
to show the reliability of this test." /d. at 712, 398
N.Y.S.2d at 507.
In addition, a study of TMDT has revealed
several major problems with the technique. See
Stevens & Messler, The Trace Metal Detection
Technique (TMDT): A Report Outlining a Procedure
tor Photographing Results in Color, and Some Factors Influencing the Results in Controlled
Laboratory Tests, 19 J. Forensic Sci. 496 (1974).
First, that study "quickly disclosed the inadequacy
of relying solely upon black-and-white photographs
.... " /d. at 498. Second, "it is far better, whenever
possible, to have the actual weapon involved
available in order to directly compare any patterns
observed on the suspect and the pattern known to
result from handling that particular gun. There is
always the possibility that the particular gun or
tool used in the commission of a crime might impart a pattern sufficiently unique as to make a
positive connection between the instrument and
suspect possible. In any event, we strongly suggest that prospective users of the technique give
some consideration to establishing a policy of
routinely refusing requests to perform examinations unless the gun is available for direct comparison, at least until the observer has acquired
considerable experience and familiarity with the
various patterns." ld. at 500. This statement suggests that objects other than a gun may produce a
pattern that may appear consistent with a gun pattern. Third, the utility of the test varies between
subjects: "Some individuals always seemed to be
good subjects for the tests, while others consistently displayed indistinct or moderately intense
patterns." /d. at 501. Finally, the utility of the test
varies depending on the object; the test "is influenced greatly by factors concerning the surface
conditions of the object material. Indeed, some
guns failed to produce any patterns under any conditions." /d.
See also Goldman & Thornton, A New Trace Ferrous Metal Detection Reagent, 21 J. Forensic Sci.
625 (1976); Glass & Grais, A New Trace Metal
Detection Reagent, 26 J. Forensic Sci. 247 (1979).

(1976).
Although it is highly unlikely that a positive
identification can be made by bite mark comparison, often it is possible to eliminate a suspect
through this technique. If the comparison shows
that the defendant's dentition is inconsistent with
the bite mark, it follows that the defendant's teeth
could not have made the mark. See Dinkel, The
Use of Bite Mark Evidence as an Investigative Aid,
19 J. Forensic Sci. 535 (1974) ("Currently, the major
contribution of bite mark evidence is the elimination of suspects since the establishment of a
positive identification is rare.")
See also A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 16 (2d ed. 1978);
Note, The Admissibility of Bite-Mark Evidence, 51
S. Cal. L. Rev. 309 (1978).
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
Fingerprint identification evidence frequently is
used to connect a suspect with a crime scene.
There are only a few ways to challenge fingerprint
evidence. First, "[o]ne of the limiting factors in
fingerprint identifi<;;ation is that from a study of a
latent fingerprint alone it cannot be determined at
what time or date the impression was made." A.
Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases 389 (2d ed. 1978). Therefore, if it
can be shown that the defendant had innocent access to the place where the print was discovered,
the probative value of the evidence becomes
marginal.
In State v. Miller, 49 Ohio St.2d 198, 361 N.E.2d
419 (1977), the Ohio Supreme Court considered the
sufficiency of fingerprint evidence. The Court
stated:

BITE MARK COMPARISONS
In recent years a number of courts have admitted expert testimony concerning the comparison of
bite mark impressions found on a homicide
victim's body with im'pressions of a defendant's
dentition. E.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d 100,
126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975); People v. Slone, 76 Cal.
App.3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978); People v.
Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976).
See also Annat., 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977).
The principal problem with bite mark evidence
involves the interpretation of the comparative
analysis. For example, in Slone the expert testified
that "it is very highly probable that the bite mark
on the victim was perpetrated by teeth belonging
to the defendant." /d. at 621, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
In State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563
(1978), the expert went much further, testifying,
"that there is an eight in one million probability
that the teeth marks found on the deceased
breasts were not made by appellant." /d. at 258,
585 P.2d at 566. Such testimony overstates the
conclusions that may be drawn from bite mark
comparisons. Dr. Irvin Sopher has written:

In determining the sufficiency of the fingerprint
evidence, a reviewing court must examine this
evidence on a case-by-case basis. The crucial issue
is whether attendant circumstances, such as the
location of the accused's alleged fingerprint, the
character of the premises where the print was
found, and the accessibility of the general public to
the object on which the print was impressed are
sufficient to justify the trier of fact to conclude not
only that the accused was at the scene of the
crime when it was committed, but also that the accused was the criminal agent. /d. at 202-03, 361
N.E.2d at 422-23.

Second, in cases of marginal ridge detail experts may disagree on whether fingerprint
evidence is conclusive. There are a number of factors that may account for this disagreement: "A
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statistical evidence of hair analysis was presented
erroneously to the jury.

ridge count between two characteristics may be erroneous if dirt or dust has caused a ridge to appear as one or two islands; ... variation in
pressure may cause discrepancies between prints
such as a bifurcation being registered in another
print as an ending ridge; ... excess pressure in an
inked print may squeeze several ridges together so
that they may appear as one ridge; ... powder
used to develop prints may stick between ridges,
indicating the presence of a ridge characteristic
where there is none .... " A. Moenssens & F.
lnbau, supra, at 392.
Fingerprint evidence also can be used affirmatively by the defense. For example, the discovery
of crime-scene prints of a third party would assist
the defense in establishing that the defendant had
not committed the charged offense. The relevance
of this type of evidence was recognized by the
court in Corley v. State, 335 So.2d 849 (Fla. App.
1976): "On this appeal from a conviction for second degree murder, we reverse for a new trial
because of the trial court's erroneous exclusion of
preferred testimony that the only identifiable
fingerprints on a vodka bottle found on a couch
near the victim's body were those of an unidentified third person and had been made neither by
the decedent nor the defendant. The evidence was
plainly admissible in support of the defense that
the crime was committed by someone other than
the defendant .... " /d. at 850.
See generally FBI, The Science of Fingerprints
(1973); A. Moenssens, Fingerprints and the Law
(1969); A. Moenssens, Fingerprint Techniques
(1971); Fingerprints, 5 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 77
(1960).
HAIR COMPARISONS

MISCELLANEOUS TECHNIQUES
The scope of this article does not permit the examination of all the scientific techniques currently
used in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Nevertheless, the following techniques (and
references) are important and therefore are noted
briefly.
Forensic Pathology
In most homicide prosecutions a forensic
pathologist will be able to provide important information concerning the cause and manner of death,
the time of death, and the identification of the victim. There are a number of excellent texts on the
subject. See L. Adleson, The Pathology of
Homicide (1974); R. Fisher & C. Petty, A Handbook
of Forensic Pathology for Non-Forensic
Pathologists (1977); Gradwhol, Medicolegal Investigation of Death (1972). See also A. Moenssens
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases
ch. 5 (2d ed. 1978).
Blood and Semen Examinations
In many criminal investigations it is important to
know whether a stain is human blood, and if
human blood, the type. Moreover, the identification
of a substance as semen is frequently crucial in
rape prosecutions. Texts on blood and semen examinations include: A. Moenssens & F. lnbau,
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 6 (2d ed.
1978); C. McCormick Evidence§ 211 (2d ed. 1972);
Examination of Biological Fluids, 41 FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 12 (June 1972).
Drug Analysis
Prosecutions for the possession, sale, or
distribution of controlled substances inevitably involve the chemical analysis of the substance. A
number of challenges to laboratory tests have
been considered by the courts. See U.S. v.
Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (only
L-cocaine proscribed by federal statute and
polarimeter analysis required to detect this type of
cocaine); State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979)
(upholding a trial court's ruling that common
laboratory tests for marihuana failed to establish
identity of seized substance). A number of texts
and articles treat the subject of laboratory drug
tests. See D. Bernheim, The Defense of Narcotics
Cases ch. 4 (1972); F. L. Bailey & H. Rothblatt,
Handling Narcotics and Drug Cases 290-95 (1972);
Shapiro, Chemical Defenses in Drug Cases, 2 Nat'l
J. Crim. Defense 131 (Spring 1976); Shellow, The
Expert Witness in Narcotics Cases, in ABA, Effective Criminal Trial Techniques 173 (B. George ed.
1978); Stein, Laessig & lndriksons, An Evaluation
of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic
Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their
Analysis, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 727.
Firearms Identifications
Firearms identification is a well-established
forensic technique. Firearms identification examiners often are referred to as "ballistics" experts; such a designation is erroneous because
ballistics, the study of the motion of a projectile,
has little to do with firearms identifications. In addition to comparative analysis of bullets, firearms
identification experts are involved in an assortment of related techniques such as toolmark iden-

In many crimes of violence, such as homicide
and rape, there is an exchange of trace elements,
such as hair and fibers, between the assailant and
the victim~ The admissibility of hair comparisons
has proved controversial, principally because prosecution experts have overstated the conclusions
that can be drawn from such a comparison. Currently, an expert cannot state, except in a rare
case, that a sample of hair came from a particular
__ person. Thus, the FBI will reach one of the following conclusions after comparing two samples:
a.

b.
c.

Hairs match in microscopic charcteristics and
originated either from same individual or from
another individual of same race whose hairs
exhibit the same microscopic characteristics.
Hairs are dissimilar and did not originate
from same individual.
No conclusion could be reached. FBI, Handbook of Forensic Science 25 (Rev. 1978).

Obviously, the prosecution will introduce only
testimony embracing the first conclusion. The probative value of this evidence depends, of course,
on the number of persons "of the same race
whose hairs exhibit the same microscopic
characteristics." There could be a million people
Who fall into that category.
In order to enhance. the value of such evidence,
some prosecutors have attempted to introduce
statistical evidence. Evidence of the probability
that a sample of hair came from the defendant
easily can be misunderstood and misused. For a
~ase illustrating such misuse, see U.S. v. Massey,
594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the court
reversed the defendant's conviction because
7

device); Tiffin v. Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 290
N.E.2d 198 (1970) (VASCAR); City of Akron v. Gray,
60 Misc. 68, 379 N.E.2d 429 (1979) (K-55 radar unit).
See also State v. Boyington, 153 N.J. Super. 252,
379 A.2d 486 (1977) (Decatur Ragun); State v.
Musgrave, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2404 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1979) (K-55 radar device).
See also A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 13 (2d ed. 1978); C.
McCormick, Evidence §210 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 47
A.L.R.3d 822 (1973).
Hypnotic Evidence
The courts generally have excluded testimony of
a witness while under hypnosis. A number of
courts, however, have admitted the testimony of a
witness whose memory has been stimulated by
hypnosis. See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503
F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Narciso, 446 F.
Supp. 252, 277-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). See
generally A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases 632-38 (2d ed. 1978);
Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic
Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Suspectiblft?,
38 Ohio St. L.J. 567 (1977); Herman, The Use of
Hypno-lnduced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25
Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1964); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442
(1979).
Psychological Stress Evaluation
The psychological stress evaluator (PSE) is an
instrument that is designed to detect stress in the
human voice and is used to determine whether a
subject is being truthful or not. In short, it is a type
of lie detector. It has not been shown, however, to
be as reliable as the polygraph. The one case that
considered the admissibility of PSE evidence, rejected it. See Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355
A.2d 527 (1976). See generally A. Moenssens & F.
lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 638-43
(2d ed. 1978); Note, The Psychological Stress
Evaluator: Yesterday's Dream - Tomorrow's
Nightmare, 24 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 299 (1975); Note,
The Psychological Stress Evaluator: A Recent
Development in Lie Detector Technology, 7
U.C.D.L. Rev. 332 (1974).
Remote Sensing Evidence
Remote sensing evidence has been a factor in
several criminal cases. See U.S. v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d
508 (9th Cir. 1978) (Forward Looking Infrared
System used to establish the identity of aircraft
held inadmissible); U.S. v. Mora-Chavez, 496 F.2d
1181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974)
(ground sensors used to establish probable cause).
The subject is treated exhaustively in Latin, Tannehill & White, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1300 (1976). See
also 19 Santa Clara L. Rev. 491 (1979).
Photographic Evidence
The most comprehensive work on photographic
evidence, is a three-volume text: C. Scott,
Photographic Evidence (2d ed. 1969).

tifications, cartridge case identifications, muzzle
to target distance determinations, and obliterated
serial numbers restoration. In an early case, an
Ohio court accepted the testimony of a firearms
identification examiner. See Burchett v. State, 35
Ohio App. 463, 172 N.E 555 (1930). See also Annot.,
26 A.L.R.2d 892 (1952). See generally A. Moenssens
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases
ch. 4 (2d ed. 1978); J. Mathews, Firearms Identification (1973); Firearms Identification, 29 AM. JUR.
Proof of Facts 65 (1962).
Questioned Document Examinations
Questioned document examiners frequently are
encountered in criminal prosecutions, especially
forgery and fraud cases. In addition to handwriting
comparisons, questioned document examiners
compare handprinting and typewriting as well as
examine paper and watermarks. The Ohio cases
are discussed in R. Markus, Handbook for Ohio
Lawyers § 264 (1973). See generally A. Moenssens
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases
ch. 10 (2d ed. 1978); J. Conway, Evidential
Documents (1959); 0. Hilton, Scientific Examination of Documents (1956).
Intoxication Tests
Whether or not a defendant was intoxicated is a
critical issue in driving under the influence, R.C.
4511.19, and vehicular homicide prosecutions, R.C.
2903.07. Evidence of intoxication also may be used
to establish that a defendant did not possess the
requisite mental state in homicide prosecutions.
See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 341 (1972).
The admissibility of intoxication tests is recognized by R.C. 4511.19-.191. A number of cases have
considered the admissibility of various intoxication
tests. See State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374
N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Steele, 52 Ohio St.2d
187, 370 N.E.2d 740 (1977); City of Columbus v.
Marks, 118 Ohio App. 359, 194 N.E.2d 791 (1963).
See generally A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 2 (2d ed. 1978); C.
McCormick, Evidence § 209 (2d ed. 1972); Annot.,
72 A.L.R.3d 325 (1976).
Speed meters
Evidence of the speed of an automobile as
determined by radar and VASCAR has long been
accepted by the courts. In State v. Aquilera, 25
Grim. L. Rptr. 2189 (Fla. County Ct. 1979), however,
a Florida trial court refused to accept radar
evidence. The Aquilera decision has generated a
nationwide debate on the reliability of radar and
other types of speedmeters. See Schuon, Police
Radar Examined Amid Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1979, § C, at 1, col. 1. Several Ohio cases have
considered the admissibility of speedmeters. Most
of these cases, however, were decided prior to the
current controversy. See City of East Cleveland v.
Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958)
Uudicial notice of radar); State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio
App.2d 115, 346 N.E.2d 345 (1976) (MR-7 radar
device); State v. Wilcox, 40 Ohio App.2d 380, 319
N.E.2d 615 (1974) (radar); State v. Bonar, 40 Ohio
App.2d 360, 319 N.E.2d 388 (1973) (DC-7 radar
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